Salt Lake City v. Rocky Williams : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Salt Lake City v. Rocky Williams : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeanne Robison; Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner.
Jeanne M. Robison; Assistant City Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Williams, No. 20040942 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5336
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rocky Williams, : Appellate Case No. 20040942-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
v. : Priority No. : 2 BRIEF 
UTAH 
Salt Lake City, : DOCUMENT 
KFU 
Plaintiff/ Appellee. : *j* 
JV10 
DOCKET NO.QOOH 0 3 4 5 1 - 0 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT 
This Appeal is from a Final Judgment of the Third District Court, entered on July 9, 
2004, entering the Defendant's convictions for Violation of a Protective Order and Threat 
Against Life or Property pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty, and the final order of 
sentence imposed by Judge Deno Himonas on October 1, 2004. 
Jason Schatz (Bar # 9969) 
Schatz & Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jeanne Robison 
Assistant City Attorney 
Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
349 S. 200 E., 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 APR " *» 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rocky Williams, : Appellate Case No. 20040942-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
v. : Priority No. : 2 
Salt Lake City, : 
Plaintiff/ Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT 
This Appeal is from a Final Judgment of the Third District Court, entered on July 9, 
2004, entering the Defendant's convictions for Violation of a Protective Order and Threat 
Against Life or Property pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty, and the final order of 
sentence imposed by Judge Deno Himonas on October 1, 2004. 
Jason Schatz (Bar # 9969) 
Schatz & Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jeanne Robison 
Assistant City Attorney 
Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
349 S. 200 E , 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the Case 3 
Course of Proceedings Below 3 
Factual Background 6 
SUMMARY OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE ON APPEAL 7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF 
THE DECEASED VICTIM, DYCIE ALLRED, THROUGH 
THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES ERIC SANDERS AND 
OFFICER DON OUIMETTE VIOLATED THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT 
AND CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM 
10 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDA 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Crawford V.Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 4, 9, 13-17 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 
State v. Webb, 779p. 2d 1108, (Utah 1989) 11-12 
RULES 
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 9 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 9, 17 
Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 9, 17 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI (passim) 
Utah State Constitution-Article 1, Section 12 (passim) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rocky Williams, : Appellate Case No. 20040942-CA 
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Salt Lake City, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 77-18a-l 
and U.C.A. 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in denying the Defendant's repeated Motions to 
Suppress the Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred and allowing Officer Don Ouimette and 
witness Eric Sanders to testify as to hearsay statements made by the deceased victim, 
Dycie Allred. 
Standard of Review: In order to overturn a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, the court's factual findings would have to be shown to be clear error. 
The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1 8, 37 P.3d 260 
If the appellate court finds that trial counsel's request was something other than a 
motion to suppress, the trial court's decision to admit or preclude evidence is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL: Counsel for the Defendant raised 
the issue of the admissibility of the deceased's hearsay statements in several pre-trial 
motions and again at trial. (See attached copies of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred and Motion to Reconsider Motion to Suppress 
Statements of Dycie Allred and Transcript of Jury Trial, pages 8-12) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution-Sixth Amendment 
Utah State Constitution-Article 1, Section 12 
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
In this appeal, the Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions for Violation of a 
Protective Order and Threat Against Life or Property, which were entered following a 
jury verdict of guilty. The Jury Trial was held on July 9, 2004, before the Third District 
Court, Judge Robin Reese presiding. Sentencing was held on October 1, 2004. It is the 
position of the Appellant that the court erred in refusing to grant the Defendant's repeated 
pre-trial Motions to Suppress the hearsay statements of the deceased victim, Dycie 
Allred. It is the Defendant's position that had the court not erred and had the statements 
been suppressed, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to the 
Defendant and therefore he is entitled to a new trial. 
Course of Proceedings Below: 
The Defendant was arrested for as a result of an incident which was alleged to 
have occurred in the early morning hours of July 17th, 2003. The Defendant was 
subsequently charged with Count 1, Violation of a Protective Order, Count 2-Reckless 
Endangerment, Count 3-Interfering with Legal Arrest, and Count 4-Threat Against Life 
or Property. Prior to trial, the City moved to dismiss Count 2 Reckless Endangerment 
and Count 3-Interfering with Legal Arrest, was severed from the other charges by the 
court's granting of the Defendant's Motion to Sever. 
The Defendant's case was originally set for jury trial on December 11, 2003. 
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However, prior to the trial, the victim passed away due to heart complications. Due to 
the death of the victim, the jury trial was stricken and another Pre-trial Conference was 
scheduled on December 15th, 2003. at the Pre-trial Conference on December 15th, 2003, 
the court set this matter for a Motion Hearing on the admissibility of the hearsay 
statements of the deceased victim, Dycie Allred. Prior to the Motion Hearing, the City 
filed a Memorandum Seeking a Ruling of Admissibility Regarding Hearsay Statements 
of a Complaining Witness, and the Defense filed a Motion to Exclude Hearsay 
Statements of Dycie Allred. A hearing on the respective motions of the parties was held 
on January 16th, 2004, before the Third District Court, Judge Michael K. Burton 
presiding. 
At the January 16th, 2004, Motion Hearing, the court heard testimony from 4 
witnesses, Eric Sanders, Officer Don Ouimette, Joy McMannis, and Mille Williams. At 
the conclusion of the testimony and argument from both parties, Judge Burton ruled that 
that the hearsay statements of the deceased victim were not admissible as Excited 
Utterances and/or Present Sense Impressions, but were admissible pursuant to Rule 
804(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A Jury Trial was then scheduled for March 12th, 
2004. 
Prior to the Jury Trial on March 12th, 2004, the United States Supreme Court 
announced its ruling in the case of Crawford v. Washington. In light of the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Crawford, the Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the court's 
previous ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay statements of the deceased victim, 
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Dycie Allred. On March 12 , 2004, the Court, Judge Burton, heard oral argument from 
both parties regarding the Defendant's Motion to reconsider and took the matter under 
advisement and set another Pre-trial Conference on April 19 , 2004, and a Jury Trial on 
April 21st, 2004. 
At the Pre-trial Conference on April 21st, 2004, the court ruled on the Defendant's 
Motion to Reconsider and denied the Defendant's motion. The Jury Trial set for April 
21st, 2004, was continued to July 9, 2004, and a final Pre-trial Conference was schedule 
don June 21st, 2004. 
Following the Pre-trial Conference on April 21st, 2004, Judge Burton retired and 
the case was reassigned to his replacement, Judge Deno Himonas. The Defendant then 
filed a Motion to Renew Defendant's Motion to Suppress Hearsay Statement of Dycie 
Allred asking the new trial judge to review the Motion to Suppress previously denied by 
Judge Burton. The matter came before Judge Himonas for a Pre-trial Conference on June 
21st, 2004, at which time Judge Himonas set the case for argument on the Defendant's 
Motion to Renew Defendant's Motion to Suppress Hearsay Statement of Dycie Allred on 
June 28th, 2004. At the hearing on June 28th, 2004, Judge Himonas granted in part and 
denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Renew Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Hearsay Statement of Dycie Allred and directed counsel for the Defendant to prepare an 
appropriate findings and order. 
The Defendant's case finally came before the court for a jury trial on July 9th, 
2004. At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty to Count 1, 
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Violation of a Protective Order and Count 4-Threat Against Life or Property. On 
September 16th, 2004, the Defendant appeared before Judge Himonas for a Pre-trial 
Conference on the severed count of Interfering with Legal Arrest and pled guilty to Count 
3-Interefering with Legal Arrest. October 1st, 2004, the court imposed sentence on all 
three of the Defendant's convictions. The Defendant subsequently filed a Notice of 
Appeal on October 26 , 2004. It is from this final judgment of the Third District Court 
entering the Defendant's conviction and imposing sentence that the Appellant now 
appeals. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The facts elicited at trial are briefly summarized as follows. On or about July 17, 
2003, the Defendant went to the dollar movie theatre in Sugarhouse. Unbeknownst to the 
Defendant, the victim, Dycie Allred, and her current boyfriend, Eric Sanders, had 
attended the same movie. Following the movie there was an incident in the parking lot 
outside the theatre were the Defendant had contact with the victim, Dycie Allred, who 
had a previously issued protective order against the Defendant. During the course of the 
incident the victim's current boyfriend, Eric Sanders, called 911 and spoke with dispatch 
regarding the events that were occurring and relaying information being provided by 
Dycie Allred. Approximately 1 hour after the incident, Officer Don Ouimette of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department made contact with the victim, Dycie Allred, by telephone 
and interviewed her regarding the incident. 
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Prior to trial in this matter in November of 2003, the victim, Dycie Allred, passed 
away due to heart complications. Prior to her death, Dycie Allred had never testified in 
court regarding the incidents of July 17, 2003, and had never been subject to cross 
examination by defense counsel. Prior to trial the Defendant filed numerous motions to 
suppress requesting that Dycie Allred's hearsay statements be suppressed. The 
Defendant's Motions to Suppress were denied and both Eric Sanders and Officer Don 
Ouimette gave testimony at the trial regarding hearsay statements made by the deceased 
victim, Dycie Allred. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Motion Hearing-January 16th, 2004 
This case came before the trial court for a hearing on Salt Lake City's 
Memorandum Seeking a Ruling of Admissibility Regarding Hearsay Statements of a 
Complaining Witness and the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Hearsay Statements of 
Dycie Allred, on January 16 , 2004. At that hearing, witness Eric Sanders, testified that 
on the night of the incident in the parking lot of the movie theatre, he heard Dycie Allred 
state "That's him" and "Not to look at him" in reference to the Defendant. However, Eric 
Sanders did not testify as to the alleged statement "I'm going to kill you." 
Jury Trial-July 9th, 2004 
The Defendant's case came before the Court for a Jury Trial on July 9th, 2004. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial and outside of the presence of the jury, the parties 
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again addressed the issue of the admissibility of the hearsay statement of Dycie Allred 
through the testimony of witness, Eric Sanders. Mr. Sanders testified that he had heard 
the victim Dycie Allred say that the Defendant said "I'm going to kill you." (Transcript 
of Jury Trial, page 11) Mr. Sanders also testified that he "couldn't understand the tape of 
her saying that" and that he couldn't understand what Dycie was saying in the 
background when the tape was played for him the morning of trial. (Transcript of Jury 
Trial, page 11-12) Later that day during the course of the trial on direct examination, 
Mr. Sanders testified that "That's when she told me—actually said that he's going—he 
threatened to kill her, or us, or whoever was in the car." (Transcript of Jury Trial, page 
61) On cross examination, Mr. Sanders also testified that despite the fact that he was 
sitting in the passenger seat of the car in which the victim was the driver, he could not 
hear the Defendant make the statement "I'm going to kill you" that the victim, Dycie 
Allred, told him the Defendant had made to her. (Transcript of Jury Trial, page 86) 
Prior to trial in this matter and prior to her death, the victim, Dycie Allred, had 
never testified under oath and had never been subject to cross examination. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
It is the Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant's pre-trial motions to suppress the hearsay statements of the deceased victim, 
Dycie Allred and erred by allowing witnesses Eric Sanders and Officer Don Ouimette to 
testify at the trial regarding hearsay statements made by Dycie Allred. The introduction 
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of Ms. Alfred's statements at trial violated the Defendant's Constitutional right to 
confrontation of witnesses pursuant to the United States Constitution and Utah 
Constitution because he and his counsel were never given an opportunity to cross 
examine the deceased witness regarding the veracity of her statements and were therefore 
unable to adequately test her credibility as a witness. 
Rules 803 & 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence set forth the recognized 
exceptions to the Rule 802 prohibition against the introduction of hearsay testimony at 
trial. The purpose of the hearsay exceptions set forth in Rules 803 & 804 is to allow the 
introduction of statements that are deemed "reliable" due to the circumstances under 
which those statements were made. In addition to the hearsay exceptions set forth in the 
Rules of Evidence, hearsay statements were previously allowed under the 2 part test set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts. Under the Roberts test, 
hearsay statements were admissible if the prosecution could establish that 1) the witness 
who made the statements was unavailable and 2) that the statements bore adequate 
indicia of reliability. As such, the admissibility under a hearsay exception and 
admissibility under the Roberts test were identical in that the admissibility of the hearsay 
statements in both instances was based on a determination that the statements were 
"reliable." 
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Crawford v. Washington overruled 
the previous opinion in Roberts and its two part test for determining the admissibility of 
hearsay statements. In particular, the Supreme Court in Crawford found that the second 
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prong (indicia of reliability) was in direct conflict with the spirit and intent of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court found that where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitution 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. Crawford Thus, 
if a finding of reliability by a court is not sufficient to overcome the Defendant's right of 
confrontation protected by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the finding of 
reliability based on the circumstances under which the statement was given, i.e. a hearsay 
exception, likewise would not overcome the Defendant's right of confrontation protected 
by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. Therefore, no hearsay statements may be 
permitted to be introduced against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the witness is 
available and has been subject to cross examination on a previous occasion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF THE 
DECEASED VICTIM, DYCIE ALLRED, THROUGH THE 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES ERIC SANDERS AND OFFICER 
DON OUIMETTE VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS 
EXAMINE THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM 
The United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution guarantee a 
criminal defendant the right to confront and cross examine his accusers. "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses 
against him..." U.S. Const, amend. VI. "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
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cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him." Utah Const. Art. 1, § 12. 
In State v. Webb, the Utah Supreme Court ruled: 
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), we 
summarized the values protected by the constitutional right of 
confrontation, which is preserved by both the sixth amendment to 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12: 
Classically, the primary object of the constitutional right of 
confrontation is to prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from 
being used against the accused at trial in lieu of a personal 
examination and cross-examination of the witness against him. 
When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not 
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the 
witness, but of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in 
order that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor and the 
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of 
belief Encompassed in this right of confrontation is the procedural 
right of cross-examination and the recognition of certain procedural 
rights regarding the exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to 
those found protected by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay 
evidence. 612P.2dat785 (footnotes omitted); accord Murray City 
v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah 1983); Mattox v. United States, 
156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339-40, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). 
There are instances in which hearsay statements may be 
admitted against a defendant consistent with his or her constitutional 
right of confrontation. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64, 100 
S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). However, the simple fact 
that a statute or common law rule has created an exception to the 
general rule barring the admission of hearsay evidence does not 
mean that where such an exception is available, the confrontation 
clause has no application. As Anderson noted, because decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court have not established total 
congruence between the confrontation clause and the evidentiary 
rules concerning hearsay, it is possible that admission of certain 
evidence could be justified under a hearsay exception, yet still 
violate the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. 612 
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P.2d at 785 n. 31. Similarly, the fact that evidence may be 
excludable as hearsay does not mean that its erroneous admission 
constitutes a denial of the right of confrontation. See, e.g., California 
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-34, 26 L.Ed.2d 
489 (1970); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-05 (Utah 1987). 
The critical inquiry is whether the values embodied in the 
confrontation clause are impinged upon by the admission of the 
hearsay and, if so, whether there are adequate safeguards to protect 
those values. 
When an out-of-court statement is offered at trial for the truth 
of the matter asserted and the declarant is present and available for 
cross-examination, no federal or state confrontation problem is 
presented. State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 429 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356. On the other hand, if the declarant is 
not present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated 
because n[t]he essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity 
to have the accusing witness in court and subject to cross-
examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the 
finder of fact" State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356; see Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64, 70, 100 S.Ct. at 2537-38, 2541. In Ohio 
v. Roberts, the Supreme Court set out general principles for 
determining when hearsay may be admitted without impinging 
unduly upon these core values protected by the federal confrontation 
clause, even though the witness does not testify at trial: 
In sum, [1] when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. [2] Even then, his statement is 
admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." [a] 
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, [b] In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (bracketed material added). 
State v. Webb, 779p. 2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1989)(emphasis added). 
However, the Supreme Court's prior decision in Ohio v. Roberts setting forth this 
"reliability standard" has been overruled by the United States Supreme Court in it's 
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March 85 2004, ruling in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 
L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In Crawford, the court found that the use of the Defendant's wife's 
out of court statement to police as evidence at trial violated the Defendant's rights 
pursuant to the Confrontation Clause. The court concluded that where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitution 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. 
Justice Scalia's opinion traced the history of the Confrontation Clause in order to 
glean the meaning or understanding of the Framers as to what the intentions and concerns 
were for including the Confrontation Clause in the Constitution. Justice Scalia found that 
history of the supports two basic principles for inclusion of the Confrontation Clause. 
First, the principal evil at which the Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, particularly the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused. Second, the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify 
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
The Supreme Court in Crawford also found that the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause apply not only to in court statements but to out of court statements 
as well. In the current case, the statements made by Dycie Allred were all made out of 
court and at no time was she placed under oath. More importantly, Dycie Allred was 
never subject to cross examination with regard to her statements. "The text of the Sixth 
Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation 
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requirement to be developed by the courts. . . . We do not read the historical sources to 
say that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather that a 
necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that this 
requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish reliability." 
Crawford (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further stated that "Our cases have thus 
remained faithful of the Framer's understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses 
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only 
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" Crawford (emphasis 
added). 
The Court found that the rationale in Roberts departed from the historical 
principles and that the Roberts reliability standard "often fails to protect against 
paradigmatic confrontation violations." "Where testimonial statements are involved, we 
do not think that the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.' 
Certainly none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability 
exception to the common-law rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate 
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner, by testing in the crucible of cross-examination " Crawford (emphasis 
added) 
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In the present case, there is no dispute that Ms. Allred was unavailable as a 
witness as she was deceased at the time of trial. Nonetheless, it is the position of the 
Defendant that the admission of Dycie Allred's hearsay statements at the trial through 
witnesses Eric Sanders and Officer Don Ouimette violated the Defendant's constitutional 
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The second prong of the Roberts 
test which required that the prosecution establish that the hearsay statement bore 
adequate "indicia of reliability" has clearly been overruled by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Crawford. Thus, by overruling Roberts the Supreme Court has imposed a 
much more stringent standard which is that no out of court statements may be introduced 
against the Defendant at trial, regardless of the availability or unavailability of a witness, 
unless there has been a previous opportunity for confrontation and cross examination. 
This standard applies even in situations were the out of court statement which are sought 
to be introduced fall under an established hearsay exception. 
Some may argue that the application of such a standard would eliminate the use of 
any exceptions to the hearsay requirement but this is not entirely true. The accepted 
purpose of the hearsay exceptions is to allow the admission of statements or evidence that 
is deemed reliable due to the manner or circumstances under which the statements are 
made. In essence, the circumstances under which the statements were made is their 
guarantee of trustworthiness. As such, the hearsay exceptions are a mere substitute for 
the "reliability" or "trustworthiness" finding by the court set forth in Roberts which has 
now been overruled by Crawford based on a Defendant's Sixth Amendment's 
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Confrontation Clause guarantee to have an opportunity to confront and cross examine 
witnesses against him. 
However, only the Defendant in a criminal case enjoys a Constitutionally 
protected right to confront and cross examine his accusers and the witnesses against him. 
The framers of both the United States Constitution and Utah Constitution specifically 
included this right of confrontation for the criminally accused. As such, the application 
of the hearsay rules would still be applicable in civil cases or in assessing the 
admissibility of evidence by the defense in a criminal trial. The Confrontation Clause 
and the standard set forth in Crawford only applies to criminal defendants and 
specifically the introduction of evidence against the Defendant. Furthermore, out of 
court statements may still be introduced by the Defendant as long as they are not 
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted and therefore would not fall under the 
prohibition against hearsay testimony. 
In the present case, the hearsay statement of the deceased victim to witness Eric 
Sanders that the Defendant said "I'm going to kill you" was the primary piece of 
evidence from which the jury could have found the Defendant guilty of Threat Against 
Life or Property. There were no other witnesses who heard the Defendant make this 
alleged statement, including Eric Sanders who ironically was in the car with the victim at 
the time the Defendant allegedly made the threat. Furthermore, according to the 
testimony of Eric Sanders on the day of trial, he could not understand or distinguish this 
statement made by Dycie Allred from the dispatch tape played to him in open court, even 
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though he was present when the statement was made. Likewise, prior to trial, at the 
Motion Hearing on January 16th, 2004, the defense raised substantial issues as to the 
credibility of the victim, Dycie Allred, and the veracity of her statements through the 
testimony of two defense witnesses. Additionally, the reliability of the victim, Dycie 
Allred, and witness Eric Sanders is clearly subject to bias against the Defendant as the 
Defendant was the victim's ex-boyfriend and Mr. Sanders and Ms. Allred were boyfriend 
and girlfriend at the time of the incident. 
CONCLUSION 
As such, it is the position of the Defendant that regardless of whether or not the 
hearsay statements introduced fell under a hearsay exception recognized in Rules 803 or 
804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, under Crawford and pursuant to the rights guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Defendant's right to confrontation was violated by the introduction at 
trial of the hearsay statements of the deceased victim, Dycie Allred. Furthermore, had 
the hearsay statements been suppressed, there is a substantial likelihood that the outcome 
would have been more favorable to the Defendant, in light of the lack of other evidence 
to support the conviction for Threat Against Life or Property and likewise may have 
affected the jury's verdict on the charge of Violation of a Protective Order. 
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Therefore the Defendant moves this court to enter an order vacating the 
Defendant's convictions for Violation of a Protective Order and Threat Against Life or 
Property and remand this case back to the trial court for a new trial. 
DATED this day, April 4, 2005. 
JasonjSchatz 
Attorney for Defendant 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this April 4, 2005,1 personally mailed and/or hand delivered true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
UTAH CULRi Oi- Al'i', .'•.. > 
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Jeanne Robison 
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ADDEND M 
Jason Schatz ( Bar #9969) 
Steve Anderson (Bar #9394) 
Schatz & Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, Ui M i l l 
Phone (801) 746-0447 
Fax (801) 579-0606 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. ST \TE (>F UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, .1G i iON L U LXl i.»_ uh ritARsAi 
STATEMENTS o r DYriF \T \ R F D 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE #031904851 
Rocky Williams, : 
Defendant. : JUDGE BURTON 
COMES NOW, Jason Schatz, attorney of record for the Defendant, Rocky Williams, and 
hereby moves this I loin ruble *' Miri lor ,m u.Lr r\i:ludiji> ill hearsay statements made by the 
alleged victim, Dycie Allred. The prosecution has requested a hearing on the admissibility at 
- :; -\:: a;. ;iuur:..: , • ..«., .:,•: ailegea victim in this case, Dycie Allred, pursuant to 
K'lic N;)4(bi( 5) of the Utah Rule*; of Evidence due to the fact that Ms. AII red is wow deceased 
i >. li.ai ie ,. lestii} at'.r;u, ,>,ihv. on the reasons set forth below, the Defendant moves 
this cc ;rt for an Order precluding the introdiu lion of un ,ind ,ill heursa\ stulenieiils ol'lhe 
alleged victim, Dycie Allred, as they are not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) and therefore 
must be excluded. 
1 
The Defendant does not dispute that the alleged victim, Dycie Allred, is unavailable as a 
witness in this case due to her death. However, in addition to the requirement that the 
prosecution establish that the witness be unavailable, Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence also provides that: 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any 
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts) and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804. (Emphasis added) In the present case, the statements 
of the alleged victim, Dycie Allred, which the prosecution seeks to introduce fail 
to meet the standard for admissibility pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) for the 
following reasons: 
I. The Statements of Dycie Allred Do Not have Equivalent 
Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness 
Pursuant to Rule 804(5)9b), in order for the prosecution to introduce a 
hearsay statement the prosecution must first establish that the witness is 
"unavailable" and then secondly must establish that there are "circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness" of the declarant's hearsay statements. 
In State v. Menzies the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 
(1980), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged 
test for determining the admissibility of hearsay when a hearsay 
declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial. First, there 
must be a showing of "unavailability." Id. At 66, 100 S.Ct. at 
2539. Second, if the declarant is unavailable, the statement at issue 
2 
is "admissible only if it bear.- au^jiuic muiuu 01 ay. Id; 
see State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (\ Ttn> 1OK ptinq two-
pronged test established in Roberts). 
In determining whether m nun!
 (,t hearsa\ statement li.is '"'cirtuiiLslaiilial 
guarantees of trustworthiness" the court: must consider several factors. 
The I fnited States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
identified a number of factors that courts should consider in 
determining whether a hearsay statement has sufficient 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted under 
• •>v of the residual exceptions. See United State v. HalU 165 F. 3d 
: - -, 1110-11 (7th Cm), cert denied, 527 U.S. 1029, 119 S. Ct. 
:. -'. 144 L.Ed.2d 784 (1999); United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 
889, 894-95 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Kladouris, 964 f.2d 
658,663 (7th Cir/1992). 
In determining whether d MUIC . ..iU\ ;eiiUDk, . ?* 
purposes of Rule 803(24- i oine, among othe: 
factors: (1) the probable laraninn making the 
statement; (2) the circu under which it was made: and 13) 
the knowledge and quahiicatiuns of the declarant. Similarly, in 
construing Rule 804(b)(5), we have identified several additional 
factors that may be considered in determining whether hearsay 
testimony has sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness." . : i:) 
the character of the declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the 
availability of evidence on the issue; (2) whether the [statement] 
was given voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination and 
penalty for perjury; (3) the extent to which the [declarant's 
statement] reflects his personal knowledge; (4) whether the 
[declarant] ever recanted his [statement]; and (5) whether the 
declarant's statement was sufficiently corroborated. HalU 165 
F.3d at 1110-11 (Internal quotes, citations, and fottnotes omitted). 
See also Bradley, 145 F.3d at 894-95 (Identifying substantially 
similar factors as well as the additional factors of "the relationship 
of the declarant to the Defendant and the government; . . . the 
immediacy of the declaration to the event described;. 
consistency in the recitation of the statement over time; ana un-
reasons for the declarant's unavailability"); Kladouris, 964 F.2d at 
663 (identifying substantially similar factors). We approve of the 
factors recognized by the Seventh Circuit, and. with that court, 
observe that "these factors are neither exhaustive nor necessary 
prerequisites for admissibility of hearsay under [one of the residual 
exceptions],, [but] they shed, light on the sort of considerations a 
3 
[trial] court should take into account when evaluating the 
'trustworthiness' of a hearsay statement." Hall 165 F.3d at 1111. 
State v. Webster. 32 P.3d 9765 984-85 (Utah App.,2001) 
It is anticipated by the Defendant that the testimony and evidence to be 
presented at the hearing in this matter on January 16, 2003, will establish 
numerous factors calling into question the underlying trustworthiness of the 
declarant's hearsay statements. It is the intention of the Defendant to introduce 
evidence that Dycie Allred was motivated by a sense of revenge against the 
Defendant as a result of him breaking up with her and seeing other women, that 
Dycie Allred was mentally and physically unstable and had previously attempted 
suicide on several occasions5 ihat Dycie Allred has a reputation for beingf 
tiishonest and untruthful54ncluding but not limited to being unfaithful to her 
previous husband- being terminated from her employment due to theft of 
company property, and misstating the truth to police in a pnor mcidfent involvings 
the Defendant. Rocky Williams, furthermore, at the time she made the 
statements which the prosecution seeks to introduce, Dycie Allred was not under 
*iath, or subject to cross examination or penalty for perjury In light of these 
circumstances, it is the position of the Defendant, that Dycie Allred's hearsay 
statement do not meet the requirements of Rule 804(5)(b) by having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and therefore they must be 
suppressed. 
4 
II. The Statements of Dycie AMred Are Not More Probative on the 
Point for Which They Are Offered Than Any Other Evidence Which the 
Proponent Can Procure Through Reasonable Efforts 
Even iftln; amrts finiK lluil '"'kiv v < ircuinstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness in the statements of the alleged victim, Dycie Allred. her 
siaLuiie .. di. s::ii lnadmissu^e dac iu ui^  iuc; aiat there is available other 
probative evidence which the prosecution can r • .,- - : • - . - : 
In particular, thefwosgcution c~r- ~ i11 •  *'ness Eric banders to testify at trial witt 
-xegard to the ;.r-. «v - - • .-i •; • •* •* ;. ~osecution seeks to establisli 
through the admissions -*1 TK,
 t , - .,..,- anient, of Ms. Allied. 
•• the nij'hl ID question, i iveie Allred was accompanied in the vehicle by 
two other individuals, Eric Sanders and Karen Sanders. It is the understanding of 
defense counsel that like D> cie i Hired, witness Karen Sanders is also deceased, 
but witness Eric Sanders is alive and available . •. <• - *. . * -. 
According to the police reports filed in this case, on the night of the incident Eric 
Sanders was ridiiu* in ilir en s\ inllii Ihc aliened \ iclini. I J'vcie Allred, at the tune the 
offense is alleged to have occurred. Furthermore, Eric Sanders is the individual 
"'Aim urtntaeled Ihc police lu rcpoit Ihc U;:-J:_X.: .indent and spoke wiili •->; i 
dispatch on two separate occasions. As such. Eric Sanders is.a competent witness, 
. A:-a. : \ vesi:!> •. . he same tacts and circumatattEes surrounding this 
incident which the prosecution seeks io establish through . *. inlroduclioii In- Ihc 
hearsay. statement of Dycie Allred, 
It is the understanding *"•' r--^e counsel iliuf ITI» Sanders currently 
resides in Colorado, however this does not prevent the prosecution from securing 
5 
his attendance as a witness through reasonable efforts. The State of Utah has 
enacted the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State 
in Criminal Proceedings in order to assist prosecutors and Defendant's alike by 
providing a means by which to secure the attendance of out of state witnesses to 
testify a criminal trials. The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that the 
prosecution's failure to use the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses 
from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings to secure the attendance of 
witnesses in a criminal trial does not demonstrate sufficient good faith to meet the 
"unavailability" test warranting admission of the witnesses hearsay statements 
under the exceptions embodied in Rule 804. State v. Chapman. 655 P.2d 1119 
(Utah 1982) Furthermore, in the case of State V. Case the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that the prosecutor's failure to use the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of 
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings to secure a witnesses 
whose financial conditioned evidenced a lack of funds with which to travel frorr: 
her home in Alabama constituted failure to make use of the "reasonable means" 
required to meet the definition of "unavailability." 
As such, the prosecution has the ability through reasonable efforts to 
secure the attendance of a witness who can testify as to the same facts and 
circumstances that the prosecution seeks to establish through the hearsay 
statements of the alleged victim Dycie Allred. Therefore the prosecution fails to 
meet the requirements of Rule 804(b)(5)(B) which requires that in order to admit 
the hearsay statement of an unavailable witness the prosecution must establish 
that "the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
6 
other evidence w liieh the proponei it can proci ire through reasonable eiiorib and 
the statements of the alleged victim, Dycie Alfred, must be excluded. 
III. The General Purposes of These Rules and the Interests of 
-Justice Will Not be Served by Admission, of Dycie AHred's Statement Into 
Evidence 
The residual hearsay exceptions contained in Rule 803 and Rule 804 are to 
he used spariiujlx .iiml onh uinin ^pcvkil cm inn .lances nhen \\(iiT*mtol hi Slate 
v. Webster, the Utah Court of Appeals observed that: 
lhc uiah Supreme Court has said mat tne residual exception 'was 
intended for use in those rare cases where . . . [the statement's] 
admissjop is justified jwjhe inherent reliability of the statement 
ancffihe need for its admission? State v. Nelson. 777 P.2d 479.. 48? 
(Utah 1989)(emphasis added). Furthermore, several federal circus 
courts have said that Rule 804(b)(5) is to be 'used very rarely, and 
only ixiexceptional circumstances.' United States v. Trujillo* 13b 
'F.3d'l388, 1395 (10th Cir.)(emphasis added)(quoting S. Rep No 
1277, 93 d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7051, 7066 cert denied, 525 U.S. 833, 119 S. Ct. 87, 142 L.ED.2d 
69 (1998). AccordO'Brien v. National Gypsum Co., 944 f.2d 69, 
73 (2nd Cir.l991)(same); United State v. Clakins, 906 F.2d 1240, 
1245 (8th Cir.l990)(same). 
The United States Constitution and the Utah, State .Constitution, guarantee a 
criminal defenuai:. ::ie ngnt lu coiiiroiu ana cross examine his accusers. "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shaii or^oy the right to . . . be confronted with 
fhe witnesses against Hr~ " Cr^r* + ;,§12„ 
m Si^e v_^  u £•?£:- • J-*-"':":--' ":"•••*•• Coi II I: opined that "Encompassed in 
this right of confrontation is the procedural right of cross-examination and the 
recognition of certain procedural rights regai ding the exclusion of extrajudicial 
statements, similar to those found protected by evidentiary rules excluding 
7 
hearsay evidence." State v. Webb, 779p. 2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1989). The court 
further stated that "it impossible that admission of certain evidence could be 
justified under a hearsay exception, yet still violate the defendant's constitutional 
right of confrontation." and "The critical inquiry i&.whethe£,the values embodied 
in the confrontation clause are impinged upon by the admission of the hearsay 
and, if so, whether there are adequate safeguards to protect those values." J d At 
1111-12. 
In the present case, the admission of Dycie Alfred's hearsay statements 
would violate the Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him and the "interests of justice" would not be served by the 
introduction of the hearsay statements at trial. First, the prosecution has a live 
witness who can testify to the same occurrences and facts sought to be established 
by the introduction of the hearsay statements and who can be effectively cross 
examined by defense counsel. In the present case, due to the cause of Dycie 
Alfred's death and the nature of this case, any attack made by defense counsel on 
the credibility of the deceased Ms. Alfred's statements may be perceived more as 
a personal attack on a deceased person who is not there to defend herself and may 
serve itfore tor inflame and prejudice the jury againstthe defendant rather than to 
assess the credibility of Ms. Alfred's statements. 
As such, it is the position of the Defendant that under the circumstances of 
this case and in light of the availability of a live witness who can be subject to 
cross examination, the Defendant's right to confrontation in this case outweighs 
any interest the prosecution may have in the introduction of the hearsay 
8 
stau.-'iw-'.v •-:'') . u . \;i-x -i i:i^ ;oU;i J the court would not be serving the interests 
of justice by allowing the admission of Dycie Allred's hearsay statemcr, >•.•/• 
they shoui J oc suppressed. 
Based on the arguments set forth above, it is the position of the Defendant, 
\l^-, \ViT,- i •: . v • - '•;• .• ; >,-cd t h e 
required criteria for admission under Rule 804(5)(b) and therefore the Defendant 
( . . * . : ' - _. : ..: J . ^ u . : ^ iiic .introduction of any and all hearsay 
statements made by the alleged victim, Dycie Allred. 
I) \ i l i l ) tins da1 I.UIIMP J I, J.uu4 / ' / / 
/ / / 
JASON SCHATZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day, January 14, 2004,1 personally mailed and faxed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Exclude Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred to the 
following: 
Judge Burton 
THIRD DISTRICT 
450 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott Fisher 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
349 S. 200 E., # 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Rocky Williams 
468 E. 3rd Ave. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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Jason Schatz ( Bar #9969) 
Steve Anderson (Bar #9394) 
Schatz & Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Phone (801) 746-0447 
Fax (SOI)579-0606 
THIRD DISTRICT CUT'R: 
SALT . - .L - ' 
SAL! LAKE CITY, : MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULING ON 
ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY 
Plaintiff, : 'TATEMENTS OF DYnF.-\I.I.P!'!> 
v. : 
CASE #031904851 
Rocky Williams, : 
Defendant. : .'DGE BURTON 
COMES NOW, Jason Schatz, attorney of record for the Defendant, Rocky Williams, and 
hereby moves this Honorable C;;.:! :. reconsider the Court's obvious ru ine .->n the admissibility 
< . ..:,.; :^ar-;i;- s.au;i.:c:.L-. ..•! u\c.^ .v..:. : .<. light of the • •,.;... v,:iv.; :^.\:Y\.::.^ ^oiin a recent 
ruling in Crawford v. Washington, United States Supreme Court Decision No. 02-9410. 
INTRODUCTION 
\ motion hearing on the admissibility of the hearsay statements of the deceased victim, 
>•• • •• :- • ' - '• -.;:.::. •-•..•„.; :•;,_,.-< •., .Ac Jieannc Ueicnse counsel 
1 
objected to the admission of the hearsay statements of Dycie Allred on several grounds including 
that the admission of such hearsay statements would violate the Defendant's right to 
confrontation of witnesses as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Utah 
Constitution. At the conclusion of the hearing it was the ruling of the court that the hearsay 
statements made by Dycie Allred, as heard by witness Eric Sanders and Officer Quimette of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department, were admissible at trial in this matter pursuant to Rule 
804(b)(5). 
In reaching this decision the court found that the hearsay statements of Dycie Allred were 
corroborated by the testimony of witness, Eric Sanders, and therefore met the reliability standard 
of Rule 804(b)(5). The City had also argued that there were certain statements made by Dycie 
Allred which the court should find were admissible pursuant to the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions 
for Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions. However, when asked by defense 
counsel to clarify the basis for ruling that the hearsay statements were admissible, the court 
stated "They're not excited utterances in my mind to the extent that we've allowed them in but I 
think that they are statements of an unavailable witness and that they pass the test." As such, it 
was the court's ruling that the statements were not admissible as excited utterances or present 
sense impressions but were only admissible under the "sufficient indicia of reliability standard" 
of Rule 804(b)(5). 
ARGUMENT 
As argued by defense counsel at the motion hearing, admission of the hearsay statements 
by Dycie Allred would violate the Defendant's right to confrontation of witnesses pursuant to the 
United States Constitution and Utah Constitution. The declarant in this situation, Dycie Allred, 
2 
had not previously testified at a hearing and was never subject to cross examination by defense 
counsel with regard to her statements. As argued in the Defendant's original Motion to Exclude 
Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred, the United States Constitution and the Utah State 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront and cross examine his accusers. 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the 
witnesses against him. . ." Const. Art. 1, § 12. 
In State v. Webb, the Utah Supreme Court opined that "Encompassed in this right of 
confrontation is the procedural right of cross-examination and the recognition of certain 
procedural rights regarding the exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to those found 
protected by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay evidence." State v. Webb, 779p. 2d 1108, 1111 
(Utah 1989). The court further stated that "it is possible that admission of certain evidence could 
be justified under a hearsay exception, yet still violate the defendant's constitutional right of 
confrontation." and "The critical inquiry is whether the values embodied in the confrontation 
clause are impinged upon by the admission of the hearsay and, if so, whether there are adequate 
safeguards to protect those values." Jd. At 1111-12. 
The City's in it's Memorandum Seeking Ruling of Admissibility Regarding Hearsay 
Statements of a Complaining Witness relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Ohio v. Roberts for the principle that an unavailable witness's hearsay statements 
could be admitted as evidence at trial as long as the statements bore "adequate indicia of 
reliability." As set forth above, although this court found that Dycie Allred's hearsay statements 
were not admissible pursuant to the hearsay exceptions for excited utterances or present sense 
impressions, the court found that they were admissible due to the fact that the corroboration of 
the hearsay statements by the testimony of witness, Eric Sanders, demonstrated they had an 
J 
"adequate indicia of reliability." The basis of the court's ruling that the hearsay statements of 
Dycie Allred would be admissible in the present case was under the reliability standard set forth 
in Ohio v. Roberts and included in Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
However, the Supreme Court's prior decision in Ohio v. Roberts setting forth this 
"reliability standard" have recently been overruled by the United States Supreme Court in it's 
March 8, 2004, ruling in Crawford v. Washington. In Crawford, the court found that the use of 
the Defendant's wife's out of court statement to police as evidence at trial violated the 
Defendant's rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause. The court concluded that "Where 
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitution demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation" 
Justice Scalia's opinion traces the history of the Confrontation Clause in order to glean 
the meaning or understanding of the Framers as to what the intentions and concerns were for 
including the Confrontation Clause in the Constitution. Justice Scalia found that history of the 
supports two basic principles for inclusion of the Confrontation Clause. First, the principal evil 
at which the Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, particularly the 
use of ex parte exmaminations as evidence against the accused. Second, the Framers would not 
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless 
he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. 
The Supreme Court in Crawford also found that the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause apply not only to in court statements but to out of court statements as well. In the current 
case, the statements made by Dycie Allred were all made out of court and at no time was she 
placed under oath. More importantly, Dycie Allred was never subject to cross examination with 
4 
regard to her statements. "The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended 
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts. . . . We do not read 
the historical sources to say that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, 
rather that a necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that 
this requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish reliability." 
Crawford (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further stated that "Our cases have thus 
remained faithful of the Framer's understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent 
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" Crawford (emphasis added). 
The Court found that the rationale in Roberts departed from the historical principles and 
that the Roberts reliability standard "often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation 
violations." "Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think that the Framers meant 
to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of 'reliability.' Certainly none of the authorities discussed above 
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule. Admitting statements 
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, 
the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner, by testing in the crucible of cross-examination" Crawford 
(emphasis added) 
5 
CONCLUSION 
In the present case the court's ruling of admissibility of all of the proposed hearsay 
statements of Dycie Allred was based entirely on the "sufficient indicia of reliability standard" of 
Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Ohio v. Roberts. As such, in light of the 
United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Crawford v. Washington, overturning its previous 
ruling in Ohio v. Roberts, the admission of Dycie Allred's hearsay statements in the present case 
would violate the Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amended to the United States Constitution. Therefore the 
Defendant moves this court to reconsider its previous ruling and enter an order excluding the 
introduction at trial of any and all hearsay statements made by the alleged victim, Dycie Allred. 
DATED this day, March 11, 2004. 
nm 
JASON SCHATZ 
Attorney/for Defendant 
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